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It is hard to imagine rewriting a 20 year old text.  So much of it was predicated on 
the events of the time, as well as our respective theoretical perspectives at that time.  In 
Subversive Sites, we argued that law was a complex and contradictory site of social 
change for women. We brought a specifically feminist lens to the role of law in women’s 
oppression and to both its limitations and possibilities in challenging that oppression. We 
focused on the legal regulation of women in and through the family, and the role of 
familial ideology in particular. We argued that feminist engagement with law, through 
litigation and law reform, were best envisioned as forms of discursive struggle, where 
women’s rights activists have sought to challenge previously dominant norms, practices 
and roles of women, and reconstruct them as more full and equal citizens.  Law could be 
a subversive site, but it was not always so.  This question of law as a site of social change 
has remained a central question in both our scholarship in the intervening 20 years, but 
our theoretical influences and genealogies have evolved.  It would be impossible now to 
imagine writing a text like Subversive Sites1 without explicit attention to postcolonial 
theory, queer theory and neo-liberal critiques. Our work at the time was framed by a 
number of feminist influences – socialist feminism, intersectional feminism, 
poststructuralist feminism – and we sought to deploy these feminisms to construct a more 
complicated understanding of engagement with law. In the intervening years, our 
individual scholarship has continued to push forward a more nuanced and sophisticated 
understanding of law and social change, both centering and decentering the role of law.  
We have broadened the focus on our inquiries to sexuality, postcolonialism, 
neoliberalism, governmentality and popular culture. We have each sought to deploy 
diverse theoretical paradigms to better understand the role and limitations of law in social 
change.   
 
We address one basic question:  What would we do differently, with the benefit of 
20 years of hindsight?  This basic question raises many more specific ones: What did we 
miss at the time? What issues might we highlight now, with what theoretical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* We are indebted to Oishik Sircar for kick-starting this rethinking project, who 
interviewed us on the legacy of Subversive Sites. Oishik Sircar interviews Ratna Kapur 
and Brenda Cossman, ‘The Fraught Terrain of Law and Feminism: 20 Years of 
Subversive Sites’ (2016) 12(1) Socio-Legal Review 133. The ideas that we pursue in this 
essay were first developed in that conversation.  
1 Ratna Kapur and Brenda Cossman, Subversive Sites: Feminist Engagements with Law 
in India (Sage 1996). 
 
perspectives? What might we look at differently now? How might we now analyse 
feminist engagements with law, given the shift in our theoretical perspectives and the 
developments in feminist advocacy, scholarship and law?  The questions are to a certain 
extent inseparable, yet we will try to tease out what we would do differently, and then, 
given these shifts in our theoretical lens, how we would analyse contemporary feminist 
legal engagements today.  
 
What would we do differently? The theoretical framework of Subversive Sites 
would be more explicitly framed within a postcolonial feminist optic. We might 
foreground the ways in which gender is taken up within a postcolonial context by 
thinking through how gender, sexuality and culture formed the basis of postcolonial 
feminist legal thought, sutured together in and through the colonial encounter.  
Postcolonial feminism has its basis in postcolonial theory and subaltern studies, and 
challenges the central pillars of enlightenment thought including the ways in which 
history, time and the subject are constituted. By presenting a critical genealogy of gender 
through a postcolonial feminist reading, we would not only be able to contextualise the 
distinct ways in which gender has been taken up by feminists within a postcolonial 
context but also the specific ways in which governance feminism and carceral feminism 
play out in postcolonial India.    
 
In the intervening years, both of our scholarship shifted to include an explicit 
focus on issues of sexuality. Our theoretical influences diverged somewhat,2 yet were 
both influenced in different ways by queer theory, and its critical engagement with issues 
of sex and sexuality.  Both theoretically and substantively, we could not imagine writing 
Subversive Sites today without a more explicit focus on issues of sexuality. Sexuality 
certainly made an appearance in Subversive Sites, yet it remained largely subsumed 
within our analysis of gender.  Influenced by the work of Gayle Rubin, Eve Sedgewick, 
and other critical scholars of sexuality, we would approach sexuality as a unique axis of 
power, identity and practice.3 Our subsequent work engaged with sexual subalternity4 
and queer theory,5 in what we each hoped was a productive tension with feminism.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 See for example our respective articles in Jindal Global Law Review special issue on 
Law, Culture and Queer Politics in Neo-liberal times. Brenda Cossman, ‘Continental 
Drift: Queer, Feminist, Postcolonial’ (2012) 4(1) Jindal Global Law Review 17 and Ratna 
Kapur, ‘Multi-tasking Queer: Reflections on the Possibilities of Homosexual Dissidence 
in Law’ (2012) 4(1) Jindal Global Law Review 36.  
3 See for example Gayle Rubin, ‘Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the 
Politics of Sexuality’ in Carole Vance (ed), Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female 
Sexuality (Routledge 1984) 267 arguing that “an autonomous theory and politics specific 
to sexuality must be developed” (at 309). In her view, although feminist theory has made 
an important contribution to gender-based hierarchies within the realm of sexuality, “as 
issues become less those of gender and more those of sexuality, feminist analysis 
becomes irrelevant and often misleading. Feminist thought simply lacks angles of vision 
which can encompass the social organization of sexuality. The criteria of relevance in 
feminist thought do not allow it to see or assess critical power relations in the area of 
This might involve addressing LGBT engagements in law in the last 20 years, 
from the constitutional challenge to section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1861, (IPC) to 
the emergence of trans advocacy and the Supreme Court recognition of trans rights. 
Indeed, the intervening years have seen an explosion in LGBT advocacy and 
scholarship.6 But, the sexual subaltern and queer theory critiques do not focus on LGBT 
issues alone; indeed these theoretical frameworks challenge the identitarian politics of 
much LGBT activism and scholarship, arguing instead for a deeper critique of the 
sex/sexuality/gender matrices that produce the very binary identities of male/female, 
heterosexual/homosexual. Revealing its strong debt to Foucault, queer theory might 
consider the disciplinary implications of the surveillance of sexuality for subjects whose 
bodies are marked by “other” sexualities: S/M subjects, queer subjects, transgendered 
subjects, sex worker subjects, and others whose bodies are erotically charged. It would 
seek to reveal the ways in which these subjects are produced as deviant through a range 
of discursive and institutional practices. It is interested in the processes of normalisation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
sexuality” (at 309). Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (University of 
California Press 1990) similarly argued for a theory of sexuality distinct from feminism’s 
theory of gender: “This book will hypothesize, with Rubin, that the question of gender 
and the question of sexuality, inextricable from one another though they are ... are 
nonetheless not the same question, that in twentieth-century Western culture gender and 
sexuality represent two analytic axes that may productively be imagined as being as 
distinct from one another as, say, gender and class, or class and race” (at 30).  
4 See for example Ratna Kapur, Erotic Justice: Law and the New Politics of the 
Postcolonial (Taylor & Francis 2005); Ratna Kapur, ‘Out Of The Colonial Closet, But 
Still Thinking ‘Inside The Box’: Regulating ‘Perversion’ and the Role of Tolerance in 
De-Radicalising The Rights Claims of Sexual Subalterns’ (2009) 2 NUJS Law Review 
381 at 385; Kapur, above note 2. 
5 See for example Brenda Cossman, ‘Sexuality, Queer Theory and Feminism After: 
Reading and Rereading the Sexual Subject’ (2004) 49 McGill Law Journal 847; 
Cossman, above note 2.  
6 Siddharth Narrain, ‘Crystallising Queer Politics: The Naz Foundation Case And Its 
Implications For India’s Transgender Communities’ (2009) 2 NUJS Law Review 455; 
Saptarshi Mandal, ‘‘Right to Privacy’ in Naz Foundation: A Counter-Heteronormative 
Critique’ (2009) 2 NUJS Law Review 525; Arvind Narrain, Queer: Despised Sexuality, 
Law and Social Change (Books For Change 2004); Ruth Vanita (ed), Queering India: 
Same-sex Love and Eroticism in Indian Culture and Society (Routledge 2002); Brinda 
Bose and Subhabrata Bhattacharyya (eds), The Phobic and the Erotic: the Politics of 
Sexualities in Contemporary India (University of Chicago Press 2007); Gautam Bhan and 
Arvind Narrain (eds), Because I have a Voice: Queer Politics in India (Yoda Press 2005); 
Jyoti Puri, Sexual States: Governance and the Struggle over Anti-sodomy Law in India 
(Duke University Press 2016); Gayatri Gopinath, Impossible Desires: Queer Diaspora 
and South Asian Public Cultures (Duke University Press 2005).  
Comment [A1]: of what Act? 
Done	  
and in the possibilities of disruption and subversion. Notwithstanding its deconstructive 
mode and its antinormative positioning,7 much of it has been explicitly or implicitly pro-
sexual.8 It is a theoretical perspective that would lead us to focus on the many ways in 
which dominant discourses of sexuality – including law – constitute sexual subjects, 
including the particular ways in which different women’s sexualities are constituted. We 
would likely look very differently at issues around women’s sexuality – whether in 
relation to sex work, obscenity, sexual assault and/or sexual harassment.  We would 
approach these issues not simply through the lens of gender, but also through the 
multivalent lens of sex and sexuality.  
Feminist legal studies have also developed considerably in the intervening years, 
with trenchant critiques about feminist engagement with law in the forms of “carceral 
feminism” and “governance feminism”.9 Elizabeth Bernstein describes carceral feminism 
as “the commitment of … feminist activists to a law and order agenda and ... a drift from 
the welfare state to the carceral state as the enforcement apparatus for feminist goals”.10 
Janet Halley develops a similar idea with the concept of governance feminism, describing 
it as referring to “the incremental but by now quite noticeable installation of feminists 
and feminist ideas in actual legal-institutional power … Feminists by no means have won 
everything they want – far from it – but neither are they helpless outsiders. Rather, as 
feminist legal activism comes of age, it accedes to a newly mature engagement with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 See for example Queer Theory Without Antinormativity (2015) 26(1) Differences: A 
Journal of Feminist Cultural Study, on the anti-normativity of much queer theory.  
 
8 See for example Elisa Glick ‘Sex Positive Feminism, Queer Theory and the Politics of 
Transgression’ (2000) 64(1) Feminist Review 19 on the extent to which early queer 
theory affirmed transgressive sexual practices.  
 
9 On carceral feminism, see Elizabeth Bernstein, ‘The Sexual Politics of the “New 
Abolitionism”’ (2017) 18(5) Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 128-
151; Elizabeth Bernstein, ‘Carceral politics as gender justice? The “traffic in women” and 
neoliberal circuits of crime, sex, and rights’ (2012) 41(3) Theory and Society 223; and 
Elizabeth Bernstein, ‘Militarized humanitarianism meets carceral feminism: The politics 
of sex, rights, and freedom in contemporary antitrafficking campaigns’ (2014) 36 Signs 
45. On governance feminism, see Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir and 
Chantal Thomas, ‘From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to 
Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in Governance 
Feminism’ (2006) 29 Harvard Journal of Gender and Law 335; and Janet Halley, Prabha 
Kotiswaran, Rachel Rebouché and Hila Shamir, Governance Feminism: An Introduction 
(Minnesota University Press 2018).  
 
10  Bernstein (2017), above note 9 at 143.  
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power.”11 Halley is critical of the failure of feminism to more self reflectively engage 
with the question of complicity with state power.  
 Would these feminist critiques have changed the way we wrote Subversive Sites?  
Undoubtedly, we would have engaged with the critiques. Yet, in many respects, we 
believe that the conception of law that we were trying to offer – of complexity and 
contradiction – is one that is consistent with these later developments.  We fundamentally 
agree that feminist engagement with law is not simply a progressive narrative.  Feminist 
engagements can be turned against feminism objectives, as we sought to demonstrate in 
the chapter on the Hindu Right.  Similarly, feminist engagements with law could often be 
hijacked by other conservative and patriarchal ideologies, rendering the judicial discourse 
and decisions rather less than progressive.   
 
However, if we were rewriting Subversive Sites, we would likely attend more 
carefully to and delineate the engagement of criminal law and incarceration from other 
modalities of regulation. Many of the early law reform campaigns focused on criminal 
law reforms, and we argued that these campaigns could be viewed as discursive struggles 
over the meaning of gender.  While we continue to see law reform campaigns as such 
discursive struggles, we would be more explicitly skeptical of the turn to criminal law.  
First, in our scholarship in the intervening years, we have both come to focus on the 
decriminalisation of conduct: from homosexuality to sex work to obscenity. As part of 
our focus on sexuality as a unique axis of analysis, we have each, in our respective ways, 
sought to bring attention to the inappropriate and damaging ways in which consensual 
sexual conduct continues to be criminalised, and its oppressive impact on the lives of 
women and sexual minorities. Second, we have seen the rise of the carceral state, and 
agree with the critique of feminism’s complicity in the deployment of the criminal law. 
We have seen the ways in which feminist campaigns for stronger criminal laws have been 
coopted by the various law and order agendas of conservative states. And we have come 
to question the extent to which engagements with criminal law in particular can bring 
about social change, even in light of a more nuanced understanding of discursive change.  
In the intervening years, we have seen the extent to which social change lies as much in 
social media, popular culture and/or marketisation that bring about changes in social 
norms and consciousness.    
 
Yet another significant shift in our own scholarship in the intervening years has 
been an increasing focus on the role of popular culture in social change, and its complex 
relationship with questions of law and rights.12 Each of us has engaged in sustained 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Halley et. al (2006) and (2018), above note 9.   
12 See for example Ratna Kapur, ‘Unruly Desires, Gay Governance, and the Makeover 
of Sexuality in Postcolonial India’ in Nikita Dhava, Antke Engel, Christophe Holzhey 
and Volker Woltersdorff, Global Justice and Desire: Queering Economy (Routledge 
2015) at 115 and 120-126; Ratna Kapur, ‘In the Aftermath of Critique We Are Not in 
Epistemic Free Fall: Human Rights, the Subaltern Subject, and Non-Liberal Search for 
Freedom and Happiness’ (2014) 25(1) Law and Critique 24. 
	  
analysis of the ways in which issues of sexuality and gender are represented in popular 
culture, from Bollywood films to American television. We have argued that popular 
culture representations have often created space for alternative and indeed subversive 
representations of sexuality and gender. We have juxtaposed legal and cultural 
representations, comparing and contrasting the visions of sexuality and gender that are 
imaginable, hoping to use the discursive space created in popular culture to crack open 
some of law’s more conservative and paternalistic representations.   
 
In terms of substantive issues, perhaps the most glaring omission from Subversive 
Sites was the emerging critique of neoliberalism. At the time, there was a literature 
emerging around structural adjustment, with a particular focus on the impact on women 
in developing countries. We included a brief reference to the potential impact of these 
structural adjustment policies on feminist engagements with law in Chapter Two. But the 
trenchant critique of neoliberalism – including the feminist and legal literature – was only 
in its genesis.  We could say the same of the rise of the Hindu Right – it too was in its 
early stages, and many at the time thought that we were giving it too much attention.  In 
Subversive Sites, we did identify the emerging challenge of the Hindu Right.  We largely 
failed to do so in relation to neoliberalism.  
 
It would be possible to identify and critique other substantive issues that were left 
out of Subversive Sites.  While we sought to adopt an intersectional analysis, we largely 
focused on the intersection between gender and religious identities.  We did not take up 
caste, class, ethnic and linguistic identities. Would we do this differently today?  As we 
discuss further below, our analysis would certainly attend more specifically to the 
intersections of gender and sexuality, highlighting for example the ways in which familial 
ideology is informed by monogamous and heteronormative constructions of gender and 
sexuality. To further develop our concept of familial ideology, we would need to attend 
to other intersections; for example to the idea of “the joint family” that was not only 
religiously specific (to which we gestured) but also intersected with caste (to which we 
did not). We could not ignore the proliferation of feminist scholarship attending to gender 
and caste in the last two decades.13  Uma Chakrabarty for example has demonstrated the 
centrality of marriage and sexuality in the reproduction of caste, and the extent to which 
women’s sexuality was protected and regulated to uphold the purity of caste.  She has 
highlighted the role of endogamous marriage in particular in maintaining caste. If we 
were to rewrite Subversive Sites today, we would look more carefully for the ways in 
which the specific instantiations of familial ideology in law reflect and reproduce this 
caste endogamy.  We did not see it in the cases we examined, in large part because we 
did not look for it.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See for example Uma Chakrabarty, Gendering Caste Through a Feminist Lens 
(Popular Prakashan 2003); Anupama Rao (ed), Gender and Caste (Zed Books/Kali for 
Women 2005);  Sharmala Rege, Writing Caste, Writing Gender: Narrating Dalit’s 
Women’s Testimonies (Zubaan Books 2006); Janaki Abraham, ‘Contingent Caste  
Endogamy and Patriarchy’ (2014) 49(2) Economic and Political Weekly; Prem 
Choudhry, Contentious Marriages, Eloping Couples: Gender, Caste and Patriarchy in 
Northern India (Oxford University Press 2007).  
In the intervening years, feminist engagements with law have continued to 
produce outcomes that are complex and contradictory. In the sections that follow, we 
consider three significant legal interventions that cluster around violence against women:  
sexual harassment, domestic violence and rape. We ask two questions: (1) What would 
the theoretical analysis from Subversive Sites reveal in relation to each of these legal 
engagements? and (2) How would attention to the postcolonial, the carceral and the 
sexual reveal what we might not have seen with the Subversive Sites lens? We hope to 
illustrate, in concrete ways, the extent to which the theoretical framework of Subversive 
Sites continues to have analytic traction, but also the ways in which our more recent 
theoretical influences would now supplement that framework.   
 
1.0 Violence Against Women 
 
Violence against women has long been a focal point in feminist engagements in 
law in India.  As we mapped in Subversive Sites, early campaigns around sati and the age 
of consent, to second wave campaigns around rape and dowry deaths, violence against 
women has been foundational to feminist engagements with law, and a central site of 
discursive struggles over the meaning of gender. Legal campaigns against violence 
against women have continued, and in this section, we consider three different legal 
interventions: first, the Supreme Court guidelines and subsequent legislation on sexual 
harassment in the workplace; second, the civil law on domestic violence; and third, the 
Criminal Law Amendments in the aftermath of the Delhi rape case. Each of these legal 
interventions represent a different form of legal regulation: employment law in the 
context of sexual harassment, family and civil law in the context of domestic violence, 
and criminal law in the context of rape.  As such, each allows for a consideration of the 
ways in which feminist campaigns for law reform engage with these different forms of 
the law.   
  
1.1 Sexual Harassment in the Workplace 
 
 Sexual harassment, as a specific legal concept, is of recent vintage in India.  The 
practice of unwanted sexual advances, remarks or acts had previously been addressed 
within the IPC (IPC) within the framework of insulting or outraging the modesty of 
women.  Section 354 criminalised assault or use of criminal force against a woman, 
“intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her 
modesty”.14 Section 509 prohibited any word, gesture or act “intended to insult the 
modesty of a woman”.15 Unwanted sexual practices were not tied conceptually to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Section 354 of the IPC states “Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any woman, 
intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty, 
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 
two years, or with fine, or with both.” 
15 Section 509 of the IPC states “Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any 
woman, utters any word, makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object, intending 
that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture or object shall be seen, by 
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discrimination and harassment, but rather, to protectionist notions of women’s sexuality.  
Modesty was not defined within the IPC but articulated through the case law.   
 
One of the first high profile cases, bringing considerable media attention to the 
issue of sexual harassment was the complaint brought by Rupan Deol Bajaj, against KPS 
Gill, the Director General of Police in the northern state of Punjab. The complaint was 
filed under both ss 354 and 509 of the IPC. Gill was charged with slapping the 
complainant on her “posterior” and sexually intimidating her at a dinner party. Although 
the High Court quashed the complaint, it was reinstated by the Supreme Court in 2005.16 
Gill was fined a large sum of money, to be paid to Bajaj as compensation in lieu of 
spending three months in harsh imprisonment.  
 
The Supreme Court decision has been hailed by some as a feminist victory, and 
Bajaj commended for her courage and persistence, particularly in the face of such a 
powerful opponent. The case succeeded in bringing considerable public attention to the 
issue of sexual harassment. Yet, like many such high profile cases, the broader meaning 
of the complaint was highly contested and divisive. Many considered the allegations 
overblown, trivial and insulting to a public hero.   
 
Moreover, within the judicial discourse itself, the case illustrated some of the 
limitations of the existing criminal provisions. The complaint was framed within the 
discourse of modesty, not connected to the concepts of equality, discrimination or 
harassment. In considering the meaning of modesty, the Supreme Court referred to 
dictionary definitions and previous case law, concluding that:  
 
… the ultimate test for ascertaining whether modesty has been outraged is, is the 
action of the offender such as could be perceived as one which is capable of 
shocking the sense of decency of a woman.17 
 
On the facts, the Court stated that  
 
it cannot but be held that the alleged act of Mr. Gill in slapping Mrs. Bajaj on her 
posterior amounted to ‘outraging of her modesty’ for it was not only an affront to 
the normal sense of feminine decency but also an affront to the dignity of the lady 
– ‘sexual overtones’ or not, notwithstanding.18 
 
The Supreme Court decision in the Bajaj case, like the criminal framework more 
generally, was cast in the protectionist language of modesty. In classic protectionist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
such woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman, shall be punished with simple 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both.” 
 
16 Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj & Anr vs Kanwar Pal Singh Gill & Anr (1996) All India 
Reports 309 (Bajaj). 
17 Above note 16.  
18 Above note 16.   
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terms, women are constituted as the weak, vulnerable, chaste, modest. The harm is 
understood not to their equal dignity, but rather as a harm to their sexual chastity and 
modesty; it is a harm to their sexual morality, and in turn to a broader societal sexual 
morality.   
 
The inability of the ‘modesty’ provision to adequately address claims of sexual 
harassment ultimately led to the filing of a class action petition in 1997 in the Supreme 
Court of India. The petition was brought by a number of social action groups and non-
governmental organisations seeking legal redress for women whose work had been 
obstructed or inhibited because of sexual harassment in the workplace.19 In Vishaka v. 
State of Rajasthan (Vishaka), the Supreme Court held for the first time that sexual 
harassment in the workplace violated women’s equality rights and their right to life and 
liberty under Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution, and that employers were obliged 
to provide mechanisms for both the prevention and resolution, settlement or prosecution 
of sexual harassment. The Supreme Court set out guidelines on sexual harassment in the 
workplace and held that the guidelines were to remain in force as law until the 
appropriate legislation was passed incorporating them into law.20 The guidelines defined 
sexual harassment as including: 
 
… such unwelcome sexually determined behaviour (whether directly or by 
implication) as: 
a) physical contact and advances; 
b) a demand or request for sexual favours; 
c) sexually coloured remarks; 
d) showing pornography; 
e) any other unwelcome physical verbal or non-verbal conduct of sexual nature. 
The definition is followed by a somewhat convoluted paragraph suggesting that the 
complainant provide evidence of fear of reprisal or discriminatory treatment in relation to 
her work, such as adverse impact on the possibility of promotion or recruitment, should 
she object to the impugned conduct. In other words, there is a suggestion that the conduct 
in question not only be demonstrated as unwelcome, but also as creating a hostile work 
environment.  
The parameters of the Vishaka guidelines and definition were clarified in a 
subsequent decision. In Apparel Export Promotion Council (AEPC) v AK Chopra (AEPC), 
the Supreme Court again considered the question of sexual harassment and the application 
of the guidelines.21 In this case, the complainant lodged a sexual harassment complaint 
against the chairman of the company. After an inquiry, the chairman was dismissed. He 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Vishaka v State of Rajastha (1997) All India Reports 3011 (SC).  
20 This position was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Medha Kotwal Lele and Ors v 
Union of India and Ors (2013) All India Reports 93 (SC). 
21 Apparel Export Promotion Council v AK Chopra (1999) All India Reports 625 (SC). 
 
challenged the dismissal through the courts, on the ground that he had never actually 
touched the complainant. As described in the facts, the chairman had tried on several 
occasions to molest her, but had never actually touched her. The High Court held that 
‘trying’ to molest a female employee was not the same as actually molesting her, and that 
the chairman’s conduct could not therefore be impugned. The company appealed to the 
Supreme Court.  
The Supreme Court accepted the definition of sexual harassment as laid out in 
Vishaka, and had no difficulty concluding that attempting to molest is sexual harassment:   
“the behaviour of the respondent did not cease to be outrageous for want of an actual 
assault or touch by the superior officer.”22  In so doing, the Supreme Court made clear 
that the definition of sexual harassment includes attempts to sexually touch, and was not 
restricted to actual touching.   
 
However, the reasoning of the Supreme Court reached this conclusion by drawing 
on an older reference to the pre-Vishaka discourse of modesty and decency, rather than a 
right to bodily integrity or sexual autonomy. The Court stated for example that “any 
action or gesture which, whether directly or by implication, aims at or has the tendency to 
outrage the modesty of a female employee, must fall under the general concept of the 
definition of sexual harassment”.23 In the Court’s view, the conduct of the chairman in 
trying to sit next to the complainant and touch her, despite her protests, constituted 
“unwelcome sexually determined behavior” on his part, and was an attempt to “outrage 
her modesty”.  His behaviour was against “moral sanctions” and did not withstand the 
test of “decency and modesty”, and therefore amounted to unwelcome sexual advances. 
The Supreme Court made explicit reference to sexual harassment as a form of sex 
discrimination and a violation of Constitutional rights.24  But, it did so in a manner that 
also tied sexual harassment to harm to modesty and sexual morality, thereby suturing the 
older protectionist discourse to the definition of sexual harassment.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22   Above note 21 at para 29 
23  Above note 21 at para 24.  
24 After citing the definition from the Vishaka case, the Court stated, in a clear 
recognition of the discourses of equality:  “An analysis of the above definition, shows 
that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination projected through unwelcome 
sexual advances, request for sexual favours and other verbal or physical conduct with 
sexual overtones, whether directly or by implication, particularly when submission to or 
rejection of such conduct by the female employee was capable of being used for effecting 
the employment [sic] of the female employee and unreasonably interfering with her work 
performance and had the effect of creating an intimidating or hostile working 
environment for her. There is no gainsaying that each incident of sexual harassment, at 
the place of work, results in violation of the Fundamental Right to Gender Equality and 
the Right to Life and Liberty the two most precious Fundamental Rights guaranteed by 
the Constitution of India.” Above note 21 at para 26. 
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In 2013, the Central Government passed the Sexual Harassment of Women at 
Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act 2013 (SHWWA), which 
superseded the Vishaka guidelines. The SHWWA closely follows the Supreme Court 
guidelines.25 Unlike the protectionist discourse of the IPC modesty provisions, the 
preamble of the SHWWA categorically states that sexual harassment is a violation of 
women’s fundamental rights to equality and life. It further provides that women have the 
right to a safe environment in the workplace, free from sexual harassment. In a separate 
section, the Act sets out the circumstances that may amount to sexual harassment, which 
includes conduct that interferes with a woman’s work or creates an intimidating, 
offensive or hostile work environment for her; or constitutes health and safety problems 
for her.26 The remainder of the Act sets out the procedural requirements for complaints 
and the duties on employers. 
 
At one level, both the Vishaka ruling and the SHWWA appear to be a feminist 
victory. Both recognise the pervasive harms of sexual harassment that women experience 
in the work place, and seek to put into place duties and procedures whereby employers 
are both made responsible for redressing any such harassment. But, using our analysis 
from Subversive Sites, we can see how the development of the sexual harassment law has 
emerged as a site of contradiction for feminist engagements with law. On one hand, the 
law now explicitly recognises sexual harassment as legally actionable.  It has done so in a 
manner that links sexual harassment with sex discrimination and the constitutional rights 
of women. However, it has not done so in complete rupture from the discourses of the 
past. Rather, the language of modesty, decency and morality continues to cast a long 
shadow over the law of sexual harassment. The harm of sexual harassment continues to 
be rooted in protectionist ideas of women’s chastity and traditional sexual morality. The 
harm is as much one of sex as it is one of harassment. The AEPC ruling as well as the 
new Act provide examples of how the right to equality is not per se a progressive terrain 
for feminist engagements, and can be used to reproduce gender and sexual stereotypes.27   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Section 2(n) of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, 
Prohibition and Redressal) Act 2013 ( hereinafter SHWWA 2013). 
	  
26 Above n 24, section 3 of the SHWWA. 
	  
27 We have addressed this issue of equality being a contested terrain in law where 
different positions on gender difference are played out. See for example Brenda Cossman 
and Ratna Kapur, ‘Women, Equality Rights and Familial Ideology’ in Ratna Kapur 
(ed), Feminist Terrains in Legal Domains: Interdisciplinary Essays on Women and Law 
in India (Kali for Women 1996); Ratna Kapur ‘Un-Veiling Equality: Disciplining the 
“Other” Woman through Human Rights Discourse’ in Mark Ellis and Anver Emon (eds), 
Islamic and International Law: Searching for Common Ground (Oxford University Press 
2012) at 265; Ratna Kapur, ‘Outliers of Gender Equality’, Feminist Legal Studies 
(forthcoming 2018). 
 
While the methodology of Subversive Sites would have led us to reveal these 
contradictory discourses embedded in the law, we would also now consider some of the 
problematic implications of the sexual harassment law through a different lens.  As Ratna 
Kapur has explored in some of her more recent work, sexual harassment law that focuses 
on the sexual part of the conduct rather than the harassment part of the conduct has 
troubling implications. As a number of feminist writers in the West have observed, sexual 
harassment laws and policies run the risk of targeting sexual conduct, including 
potentially consensual sexual conduct, while deflecting attention away from harassment 
and discrimination.28 An understanding of sexual harassment that remains tethered to a 
dominance feminism and its vision of sexuality as exclusively a site of danger risks 
identifying the harm as exclusively one of sex, rather than one of harassment.  Moreover, 
as Kapur’s work has argued, it is an understanding of sexuality that fits all too well with a 
traditional ideology of Indian women as modest and chaste. The harm, through this 
vision, is one of any and all sex threatening that modesty, rather than the harm of 
deploying sex as a form of employment harassment and discrimination.   
 
The SHWWA 2013 has done little to disturb or alter the normative scaffolding of 
gender and sexuality that structures sexual harassment. The core ingredient of the 
definition is that the sexual conduct must be ‘unwelcome’.  This is of course an important 
defining element of sexual harassment, potentially distinguishing the actionable conduct 
from consensual sexuality.  However, the complainant has the burden of proving that the 
conduct was unwelcome, and this burden remains invariably conditioned by dominant 
sexual and cultural norms, including the complainant’s conduct. More specifically, it 
means that the complainant’s sexual past, mode of dress and conduct, and conformity to 
cultural prescriptions may be introduced as relevant evidence in determining whether the 
conduct was ‘unwelcome’. Dress, behaviour, cultural conformity, marital status, and even 
profession may thus be used to demonstrate that the accused was incited to the conduct, 
and may be sufficient evidence to disqualify a claim of sexual harassment. Waitresses, 
bar-room dancers, and other performers are all vulnerable to such claims.   
 
We would also now more carefully consider the form of legal regulation deployed 
in feminist and subsequent regulatory strategies. Interestingly feminists did not pursue a 
criminal response to sexual harassment in the petition to the Supreme Court, but called 
instead for employment guidelines. At the time, they did not seek a revision to the 
provisions of the IPC and their emphasis of women’s modesty. Instead, the petitioners 
sought and received guidelines directed at employers to prevent and remediate sexual 
harassment. From the perspective of a critique of carceral feminism, this was a significant 
development and suggested that the strategy marked a break from feminism’s legal 
engagements frequently turn to the criminal law and its reliance on the carceral state.  As 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See for example Vicki Schultz, ‘Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment’ (1998) 107 
Yale Law Review 1683; Vicki Schultz, ‘Understanding Sexual Harassment Law in 
Action: What Has Gone Wrong and What Can We Do About It’ (2006-2007) 29 Thomas 
Jefferson Law Review 1; Janet Halley, ‘Trading the Megaphone for the Gavel in Title IX 
Enforcement’ (2014) 128 Harvard Law Review Forum 103; Laura Kipnis, Unwanted 
Advances: Sexual Paranoia Comes to Campus (HarperCollins 2017).  
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a form of employment law, the guidelines and then the SHWWA impose obligations on 
employers. It requires the creation of internal complaints committees, and sets out the 
procedures for inquiry. It provides amongst other things for compensation to be made 
available to the complainant, as well as for disciplinary measures to be taken against the 
respondent.  While there are no doubt questions about the relative enforceability of these 
provisions – under-enforcement is a chronic and an ongoing problem, and the SHWWA 
does not apply to the informal sector where the vast number of women in India actually 
work – the SHWWA nevertheless sought to build a non-carceral regulatory regime which 
potentially provides compensation directly to the complainant.   
 
At the same time, it is important to recognise that the SHWWA did not completely 
break with the carceral approach. The Act provides that local complaints committees may 
forward the complaint to the police for registering the complaint under section 509.  This 
highlights the extent to which the SHWWA does not displace or repeal the criminal 
provisions but operates as a supplement to them.  Sections 354 and 509, and their 
emphasis on outraging or insulting modesty, and its deeply problematic understanding of 
harm, continue to define and frame the potential carceral response to sexual harassment. 
More significantly, after the Delhi gang rape in 2012 (discussed in further detail below), 
and in light of the massive protests demanding more stringent laws, the government 
introduced an additional provision in the IPC criminalising sexual harassment. The new 
provision, section 354A, reproduced the definition of sexual harassment as set out in the 
Vishaka guidelines, and introduced a penalty of up to three years or a fine or both in the 
event of a conviction for physical contact and advances involving unwelcome and explicit 
sexual overtures; or a demand or request for sexual favours; or showing pornography 
against the will of a woman. Conviction for making sexually coloured remarks carries a 
term of imprisonment up to one year in prison, or a fine or both. Notably, the new 
provision has been included alongside the existing provision on outraging the modesty of 
a woman of a woman’s modesty. While feminists were not necessarily driving the turn to 
carcerality in this instance, there was little objection to the inclusion of this provision. 
The alignment of demands for women’s rights with the carceral apparatus of the state not 
only strengthened the security and surveillance regime within which women’s rights and 
sexuality are increasingly addressed, but also undermined some of the gains made by the 
SHWWA that sought solutions outside of the carceral regime.  
 
Further, it is important to consider the regulatory and carceral approaches to 
sexual harassment in light of neoliberalism, and its strategies of privatisation. The 
SHWWA imposes obligations on employers to enforce the rights that it creates. It is a 
highly privatised regulatory regime that fits neatly within the logics of neoliberalism.  
Although it imposes obligations, it is the employers who are responsible for setting up the 
internal complaints committees, and it is these committees that are responsible for the 
inquiry and resolution of complaints. The committees are, for the purposes of inquiry, 
delegated the same powers as vested in courts under the Code of Civil Procedure.  Given 
the enormous challenges of access to justice in the Indian justice system, with its judicial 
backlogs and overwhelmed dockets, this privatised regime is not inherently problematic.  
It provides a potential opportunity for localised access to justice. However, it is a regime 
that will need to be carefully monitored for the ways in which it does, and does not, 
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interpret the rights under the SHWWA. At the same time the incorporation of sexual 
harassment into the IPC is designed to deter and contain sexual behavior through a 
security apparatus that offers to produce the stability required for the flourishing of neo-
liberal markets.  
 
Given the pressure on employers and the desire to avoid being subjected to 
litigation or criminality, employer-drafted codes can often decree that the workplace be 
completely sexually sterile, and employers can announce a ‘zero-tolerance’ policy on 
sexual humour. It is worth considering the implications for sexual rights and sexual 
expression once we consider that sex per se is being framed within the language of 
protectionism, cultural conservatism, modesty or violence. Who determines whether an 
action has crossed the boundary of cultural modesty or is unwelcome?  
 
At one level, these questions on the scope and definition of sexual harassment are 
similar to those current in the West. However, a postcolonial lens requires that the issues 
be considered in light of the unique relationship between sexuality and culture as sites of 
contestation in India since the late 19th-century, as well as having been integral to 
assertions of nationalism and resistance to colonial rule. Constructions of sexuality are 
deeply implicated in the boundaries that are drawn between legitimate and illegitimate 
sexuality, which are further displaced onto expressions of national identity. The idea of 
outraging or insulting the modesty of women, which after the AEPC decision, has been 
firmly inscribed in the judicial approach to sexual harassment and reinforced by the new 
provision incorporated into the IPC alongside the earlier modesty provisions. Sexual 
harassment continues to be interpreted through the lens of modesty and the cultural 
construction of women’s sexual behaviour as chaste, passive, pure and virginal. The 
failure to challenge and displace the normative in our engagements with law, makes it 
possible, despite feminist efforts and engagements with law (or partly because of them), 
to re-inscribe sexuality within dominant norms. As we would have concluded in 
Subversive Sites, the legal engagements with sexual harassment indeed emerge as 
complex and contradictory, but with the additional lens of sexuality, postcolonialism and 
neoliberalism, all the more so.  
 
1.2 Domestic Violence and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 
2005. 
  
The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (PWDVA) was passed in 
2005, to provide civil remedies protecting victims of violence.  The PWDVA is distinct 
from the provisions of the IPC.  The anti-cruelty provision of the IPC, section 498(a), 
prohibits a husband or relative of the husband from subjecting women to cruelty, defined 
as “any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to 
commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental 
or physical) of the woman”.  Section 304B of the IPC criminalises violence against 
women when it can be shown that the death of a woman was caused in conjunction with 
dowry demands. These provisions have been criticised for failing to provide immediate 
and effective remedies for women who are experiencing domestic violence. The 
PWDVA, in response to this lacunae in the law, sought to provide civil remedies to 
women who are victims of domestic violence. 
 
The law has proved significant insofar as feminists have succeeded in securing 
legal protection for women in the domestic sphere that has proved resilient to such 
interventions. Part of this reluctance is a hangover from the colonial encounter, where the 
home was a site of autonomy from colonial rule, and where legal interventions in this 
arena by the colonial power were vigorously opposed by cultural and anti-colonial 
nationalists. The most radical element of the new law is that it legally recognises marital 
rape as a form of domestic violence. While the criminal law has not been amended to 
enable a woman to file a rape case against her husband or domestic sexual partner, she is 
now given access to new civil remedies, including securing a protection order or 
injunction against her abuser, including her husband.  
 
Under the new law, domestic violence is not confined to wives, but includes 
mothers, daughters, sisters, widows, divorced women living in the home, as well as, those 
who are in an informal relationship with the accused including a bigamous relationship. 
In other words, it covers all domestic relationships in a ‘shared household’. A shared 
household is very broadly defined to include a household where the abused person lives 
singly or with the abuser. Presumably the Act would also cover a man who abuses or 
beats up a sex worker with whom he has had a long standing relationship, such as a pimp, 
or an ongoing sexual relationship, though the scope of this provision would need to be 
tested in the courts. A case can be filed against any m adult person as well as other 
relatives of the husband or male partner. Thus women are not just considered victims, but 
also can be perpetrators of violence against other members of the household, including 
children, the elderly and daughters-in-laws. 
 
Domestic violence is broadly defined including physical abuse, sexual abuse, 
verbal and emotional abuse, and economic abuse.29 The Act establishes a right to live in 
a shared residence,30 and then provides for a range of orders once domestic violence is 
established. Protection orders can prevent the husband or partner from a range of 
behaviors including committing any act of domestic violence, entering a place of 
employment, communication, alienating assets, and violence towards dependents.31  
Resident orders allow the woman to remain living the household, and restrain the 
husband or partner from entering, disposing, alienating or otherwise disturbing the 
household.32 A complainant is also entitled to an order for monetary relief, to meet 
expenses of the victim and any child related to domestic violence, including loss of 
earnings, medical expenses, loss from destruction of property and maintenance.33 A 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See Section 3 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act (hereinafter 
PWDVA).   
30 Section 17 of the PWDVA. 
31 Section 18 of the PWDVA.  
32 Section 19 of the PWDVA  
33 Section 20 of the PWDVA.  
separate provision allows for compensation orders to compensate for injuries including 
mental torture and emotional distress.34 Finally, the Act provides for custody orders, 
granting temporary custody and access, including the denial of visitation if harmful to 
children.35 
 
The Act is intended to provide a broad range of immediate relief for victims of 
domestic violence, allowing them to remain in their homes, prohibiting their abusers from 
contacting them, while providing for financial relief and temporary custody of their 
children. It is a shift from the sometimes exclusive focus on criminal law, choosing 
instead to provide civil relief to the victim of violence, rather than seeking to punish the 
perpetrator.   
 
The Act has been challenged on several occasions.  While the courts have upheld 
the constitutionality of the PWDVA,36 they have also significantly narrowed its 
applicability.  Most notably is the case of Batra v. Batra, in which the Supreme Court 
significantly narrowed the scope of the shared household, and thereby limited the remedy 
available to victims of domestic violence.  Section 2(s) defines shared household as:  
 
a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a 
domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such 
a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and 
the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either 
the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, 
title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the 
joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the 
respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared 
household. (emphasis added)  
 
In the Batra case, the couple had been living in a house owned by the husband’s mother. 
The husband brought a petition for divorce. In the course of the proceedings the wife 
sought an order allowing her to live in the house, arguing that since she has lived in the 
house of the mother-in-law (along with her husband), she has a right under the PWDVA to 
reside in that house.37 Justice Markendey Katju dismissed this contention, stating as 
follows: 
 
If … accepted, then it will mean that wherever the husband and wife lived together 
in the past that property becomes a shared household. It is quite possible that the 
husband and wife may have lived together in dozens of places e.g. with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Section 22 of the PWDVA.  
35 Section 21 of the PWDVA.  
36 See for example Aruna Parmod Shah v Union of India where the Delhi High Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the Act and Dennison Paulraj v Union of India (2009) 6 
CTC Madras HC in which the Madras High Court similarly upheld the Act.  
37 Above note 28, section 2(s) read with section 17 of the PWDVA.  
husband’s father, husband’s paternal grandparents, his maternal parents, uncles, 
aunts, brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces, etc. If … accepted, all these houses of the 
husband’s relatives will be shared households and the wife can well insist in living 
in all these houses of her husband’s relatives merely because she had stayed with 
her husband for some time in those houses in the past. Such a view would lead to 
chaos and would be absurd.38  
 
The Court concluded : 
 
… in our opinion the wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared 
household, and a shared household would only mean the house belonging to or 
taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of 
which the husband is a member.  
 
The Court held that the property in question was neither owned by the husband nor part of 
joint family property, and therefore was not a “shared household”. The reasoning and 
holding runs counter to the plain meaning of section 2(s) – which specifically states that a 
property can be a shared household “irrespective of whether the respondent or the 
aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household”. The Court 
pursued what it described as a “sensible” interpretation, and in the process significantly 
curtailed the scope of the PWDVA.  
 
The Courts have also whittled down the scope of the Act by restricting the 
category of women who can apply for protection. In the case of D. Velusamy v. D. 
Patchaiamma,39 the Supreme Court limited the applicability of the PWDVA to marriages 
and relationships in the nature of marriage stating that if a man has a:  
… keep whom he maintains financially and uses mainly for sexual purposes 
and/or as a servant it would not, in our opinion, be a relationship in the nature of 
marriage.40 
The Court thus held that the PWDVA applied only to a live-in relationship 
where the couple publically held themselves out to society as spouses.41 As set out in 
Subversive Sites the case is once again reflective of what kind of woman and sexual unit 
is entitled to protection. While it shifts the goal posts to include women who are in long 
term relationships outside of marriage, it remains embedded within what we referred to 
as familial ideology, but with a specifically heteronormative, and monogamous focus. 
The progressive potential of the Act to protect mistresses is sharply curtailed and even 
mistresses who have been with the same man for a long period of time or may share a 
relationship like a marriage with the man are now excluded through the narrow judicial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Above note 28 at 175. 
39 D. Velusamy v D. Patchaiammal (2011) All India Reports 479 (SC). 
40 Above n 38 at [33]. 
41 Above n 38 at [33]. 
reading of the Act. This position was reiterated in Indra Sarma v VKV Sarma,42 where 
the appellant and the respondent were living together for 18 years and the appellant was 
aware of the fact that the respondent was married. The Court held that the appellant 
could not claim any relief under the PWDVA stating that a relationship with a married 
man was not in the nature of marriage, and that the status of the appellant was “that of a 
concubine”. The Court went on to declare that:  
A concubine cannot maintain a relationship in the nature of marriage because 
such a relationship will not have exclusivity and will not be monogamous in 
character.43 
From the perspective of our arguments in Subversive Sites, these cases reflect the 
resilience of familial ideology and the normative order, despite the ostensibly 
progressive nature of the Act. The arguments we presented in Subversive Sites continue 
to have traction in the context of the domestic violence law where women are regulated 
within the tight boundaries of familial ideology. But we would now focus more 
specifically on heteronormativity and its prescriptions of monogamy. The Act continues 
to operate against a set of exclusions, of women who are not entitled to protections from 
violence inflicted by intimate partners on grounds of their sexual conduct and status. The 
courts continue to fallback on conservative understandings of the family and women’s 
sexuality. While the extension of protections to non-marital long term relationships is 
somewhat disruptive it remains contingent on the woman’s sexual conduct and chastity.  
The PWDVA is perhaps the example in which the analysis we deployed in 
Subversive Sites continues to have the most traction, with some tweaks in emphasis. The 
analysis would have led us to reveal these protectionist and conservative discourses 
embedded in the law. The difference in analysis with our current queer and postcolonial 
lens would be subtle, but not insignificant. The idea of heteronormativity would now take 
greater salience, decentering the heuristic of familial ideology; along with its great 
emphasis on the structures and discourses of sex and sexuality. Similarly, while 
Subversive Sites would have lead us to highlight the extent to which the PWDVA 
represents a significant intervention in the private sphere, a postcolonial lens would more 
closely tie the resistance to this intervention to colonial history, and the discursive 
contestations over the domestic, the private, and the family, in the postcolonial present.  
Finally, we would emphasise the form of legal regulation; specifically the choice to focus 
on family rather than criminal law. The approach is not a carceral one, diverging from 
what has in the past been an almost singular focus on criminal law for addressing 
violence against women.   
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Indra Sarma v VKV Sarma (2014) All India Reports 309 (SC). 
43 Above note 41 at [56]. 
	  
1.3  The Delhi rape case and the Criminal Law Amendments 
 
The gang rape and murder of Jyoti Singh Pandey on 12 December 2012 has left a 
searing mark on India’s legal and political landscape. The outpouring of anger and 
outrage on the streets of Delhi and elsewhere in the aftermath forced the Central 
government to set up the Committee on Amendments to the Criminal Law (‘Verma 
Committee’) to make recommendations on legal reforms in the area of sexual violence.44 
The Committee was asked to review the existing laws and suggest amendments to better 
address the issue of sexual violence. The Committee chose to address its mandate within 
the broader framework of the Constitution and the fundamental rights of citizens, 
including the right to individual autonomy and bodily integrity. The Verma Committee 
made its recommendations within a self-imposed deadline of one month.  
 
The Report, while somewhat unwieldy in its 627-page length, made 
recommendations which were bold and far ranging in their attempt to confront sexual 
violence. The Report stated that the issue of sexual violence needed to be addressed 
through a woman’s right to bodily integrity, sexual autonomy and legal recognition of 
adult consensual sexual relationships.45  It recommended that the marital rape exception 
be removed.46 It recommended that the ‘eve teasing’ provisions of section 354 of the 
IPC be fundamentally revised, eliminating the language of outrage and modesty, and 
replacing it with language that focuses instead on “the unwelcome threat of sexual 
nature” or “unwanted advances”.  It recommended the elimination of section 509 of the 
IPC, with the targeted conduct to be better addressed within the revised section 354.  The 
Report opposed the demand that the death penalty be made available in rape cases, 
although it did recommend that some of the penalties be increased. 
 
It recommended that acid attacks and stalking be made distinctive offences. It 
recommended that same sex relationships be given constitutional protection and the right 
to sexual orientation be recognised as a human right.47 The Report framed its 
recommendations within the discourse of rights rather than an outdated notion of ‘Indian 
womanhood’ based on chastity, conservative sexual morality, honour and purity, which 
has framed much of the legal regulation of sexual violence.  Indeed, the Report explicitly 
rejected the discourses of shame and honour in which rape and sexual assault have been 
addressed, insisting instead that violence against women is a violation of a woman’s 
bodily integrity.   
 
Despite the far-sighted recommendations of the Verma Committee’s Report, the 
law ultimately enacted by the Parliament of India left out almost every single one of the 
Committee’s key recommendations that would have advanced the rights to gender 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 JS Verma, Leila Seth and Gopal Subramanium, Report of the Committee on 
Amendments to Criminal Law (Government of India, 23 January 2013). 
45 Verma, Seth and Subramanian, above note 43.   
46  Verma, Seth and Subramanian, above note 43 at 117. 
47  Verma, Seth and Subramanian, above note 43 at 51, 54 and 406. 
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equality and respect for women (Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 2013 (India) Act No 13 
of 2013 (‘CLA Act’)). It imposed the death penalty in cases where rape leads to the death 
of the victim or permanent maiming, retained the provisions dealing with outraging the 
modesty of a woman, and retained the exemption of marital rape from the purview of the 
criminal law.48  
 
The new law did nothing to challenge the dominant norms of gender and sexuality 
that have long been inscribed in the criminal and other legal regulation of sexual 
violence.  An opportunity to revise and redefine sexual crimes was instead a reinscription 
of the traditional norms of female modesty, chastity and cultural values. At the same 
time, the new law augmented the carceral power of the state to regulate and discipline the 
sexual behaviour of its citizens in the direction of fewer rights and more surveillance.49 
The addition of the death penalty for rape represented a pyric victory for the carceral.  On 
the one hand, it represented a significant discursive statement of the ultimate carceral 
punishment.  On the other, its addition was superfluous, in light of the fact that rape that 
results in death is tantamount to murder, which is already a capital offence under s 302 of 
the IPC. Yet, the successful call for the death penalty is a powerful performance of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 For an overview of the recommendations of the Verma Committee’s report that were 
accepted or rejected by the government in its ordinance, see NDTV, Read: Ordinance vs 
Verma Commission Recommendation (1 February 2013) 
<http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/read-ordinance-vs-verma-commission-
recommendations-325436>. 	  
49 For a similar analysis of the legacy of the Delhi rape case from the perspective of 
goverance feminism, see Prabha Kotiswaran, ‘Governance Feminism in the Postcolony: 
Reformig India’s Rape Laws’ in Halley et. al (2018), above note 9; see also Debolina 
Dutta and Oishik Sircar, ‘India’s Winter of Discontents: Feminist Dilemmas in the Wake 
of a Rape’ (2013) 39(1) Feminist Studies 293. Dutta and Sircar observe at 302, on the 
death of Ram Singh in prison: “For feminists, this deepens the dilemma of confronting a 
criminal justice system that weighs heavily not only against the female victim/survivor of 
sexual assault but also against the working-class male accused”.  See also Poulami 
Roychowdhury, ‘“The Delhi Gang Rape”: The Making of International Causes’ (2013) 
39(1) Feminist Studies 282-292. 
demand not only for carceral vengeance, but also for the most extreme form of the 
punishment.50   
 
         The trial of the accused in the Delhi rape case resulted in four of the accused 
ultimately being convicted under the law as it stood before it was amended and, on 13 
September 2013, they were awarded the death penalty. Sections 303 and 304 of the IPC 
provides a maximum penalty of death in cases of murder. The fifth accused committed 
suicide while being held in custody awaiting trial and the sixth, who was just under 18 
years old and hence considered a juvenile when the crime was committed, received a 
punishment of three years (the maximum that the law allows for in such cases). In 
arriving at a conviction, the system appears to have worked under the legal provisions as 
they existed prior to the CLA Act, which did not have retrospective effect. The death 
sentence was awarded under the already existing provisions that allow judges to impose 
such a sentence in the ‘rarest of rare’ murder cases. The outcome puts into question the 
need for more laws and, more importantly, compels a deeper interrogation of the 
purposes served by the subsequent legal changes. 
 
But the feminist discursive struggle over the Delhi rape case cannot be told by the 
law reforms alone. The protests in the street that followed are significant in their own 
right.  The presence of the young women on the streets of Delhi and beyond was itself a 
fundamental challenge to the traditional norms of Indian womanhood. These young 
women were from a new era of globalisation and neoliberal market reforms, coming of 
age with a different set of cultural attitudes and employment opportunities. Their protests 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 In May 2018, the Central government adopted an ordinance, amending the Protection 
of Rights of Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012 (POSCO) imposing the death 
penalty for raping a child under the age of 12. The measure was viewed as a knee jerk 
response to the outrage and protests over two sensational rapes of young minors. The first 
concerned the drugging, rape and violent murder of an 8 year old girl belonging to the 
nomad Bakarwal Muslim community, in Kathua, a town in the northern state of Jammu 
and Kashmir, in January 2018. The brutality of the rape and murder together with the 
discovery of her body at a temple, sparked outrage against the Central government, in 
particular, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), whose members appeared to support the 
rapists and also attempted to communalise the event. The second case, in Unnao, a town 
in the northern state of Uttar Pradesh, involved the rape of a 17 year old girl in June 2017, 
that involved a BJP member of the legislative assembly (MLA). The victim identified her 
rapist, though the police refused to record any names in her complaint. Instead in April 
2018, the victim’s father was arrested and placed in judicial custody. While in custody, 
he sustained serious injuries due to being subjected to a brutal physical assault and 
subsequently died from his wounds. Within days of his death the victim attempted to 
immolate herself in front of the home of the BJP Chief Minister of the state, Yogi 
Adityanath, as no action had been taken against either the accused or police. Her act drew 
public attention to the case and once again sparked outrage across the country, which led 
to the subsequent arrest of the MLA member as well as the suspension of the police 
officers involved in her father’s murder. The adoption of the death penalty was once 
again used to placate the protestors and an angry public, but also reflected the pattern of 
continuous resort by the state to penal measures in relation to sexual violence that serve 
to reinforce and strengthen the carceral state rather than the rights of the concerned 
women. 
were a powerful rejection of the valuation of women in and through traditional familial 
ideologies.  Some of the placards on the streets denounced the familial understandings of 
‘Indian womanhood’ that have curtailed and cabined women’s freedom. ‘I am not your 
mother, daughter, sister or wife. I am a citizen. I demand equal rights’. Indeed Jyoti 
Pandey herself was representative of this generation of young Indian woman – educated, 
employed, with a new degree of freedom and mobility – yet one still fundamentally 
threatened by violence.    
 
The protests also represented a sharp shift in the direction of a neo-liberal political 
rationality that is increasingly characterising and shaping the terms of gender within India 
as well as within the global context and international legal arena.51 Coming from a lower 
income bracket, Jyoti Pandey’s parents sold their land to support her desire to become an 
educated professional, and it had been her intention to in turn support the education of her 
younger siblings once she began earning enough. The image of an aspiring Indian woman 
making a valid, hard-earned place for herself within a sexist national order that is now 
also linked to a global economic order, marked a significant moment in the effort to 
inscribe the new generation within the neo-liberal schema of gender. Pandey embodied 
the aspirations of millions of such women.   
 
 The protests were an extraordinary performance of a new modality of gender and 
sexuality, one articulated in and through neo-liberal market rationality. These young 
women’s insistence of their rights and their bodily integrity was a powerful articulation 
of a new sovereignty in the direction of sexual autonomy and sexual expression that is 
both political and personal. Their mere presence in the streets challenged the traditional 
claim that women do not belong in the public sphere, and may be responsible for the 
violence committed against them there. The dress and fashion styles of this new 
generation of young Indians repudiated the oft-repeated claim that dress was somehow 
the trigger for the rape.   
 
The protests following the Delhi rape signify a profoundly contradictory moment 
in feminist engagement, not simply with law, but with the meaning of gender and 
sexuality in the public sphere more generally. The demand for rights, as sovereign 
individuals, mimics the market rationality of neoliberalism. Yet it also represents a 
powerful rejection of the values of traditional Indian womanhood. The protests as a 
demand for law reform meet with mixed results.  The most radical of the demands for the 
reform of rape law remain unrealised, yet the most carceral of the demands were enacted.  
But the results cannot be measured in law alone. To the extent that, as we claimed in 
Subversive Sites, feminist engagement with law is part of a broader discursive struggle 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 For an analysis of the Delhi rape case in the context of neoliberalism, see Sareeta 
Amrute, ‘Moving Rape: Trafficking in the Violence of Postliberalization’ (2015) 27 
Public Culture 331; Tara Atluri, ‘Bus/Bas/बस: The 2012 Delhi Gang Rape Case, City 
Space and Public Transportation’ in Surajit Chakravarty and Rohit Negi (eds), Space, 
Planning and Everyday Contestations in Delhi (Springer 2016) and Tara Atluri, ‘The 
Young and the Restless: Gender, “Youth” and the Delhi Rape Case of 2012’ (2013) 9(3) 
Sikh Formations: Religion, Culture, Theory 361-379. 
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over the meaning of gender (and we would now add, sexuality), the Delhi protests 
represent a complex and potentially transformative moment.  
 
2.0 Rethinking Feminist Engagements in and Beyond Law 
 
These three issues constitute part of a trend in the law reform campaigns of the 
contemporary women’s movement in India that have in large part focused on sexual 
wrongs, including rape, domestic violence, dowry murders, obscenity, and trafficking. 
Lobbying and campaigning on these issues has undoubtedly created a considerable 
amount of public awareness about issues of violence against women, and has resulted in 
the emergence of non-governmental organisations and other services to assist women 
who are victims of violence. These campaigns have drawn attention to the lack of 
effective laws against rape, child sexual abuse, and domestic violence in India and been 
overwhelmingly successful in translating very specific violations experienced by 
individual women into a more general rights discourse. Yet despite all of these 
engagements and successful law reform campaigns, violence against women continues to 
occur on a staggering scale. The rape, domestic violence and harassment statistics have 
only increased.52 
 
We remain critical of these interventions and our positions are reinforced by a 
postcolonial feminism as well as other critical traditions that have been critical of legal 
campaigns and initiatives on violence against women that have failed to displace the 
dominant gender and sexual norms. In fact, as the three interventions suggest, campaigns 
on violence against women have reinforced negativity about sex and sexuality and 
moralism around sex, and often reinforced dominant gender norms that invite 
protectionist legal responses towards women that are entrenched in conservative cultural 
and nationalist moorings. Thus, initiatives that, at one level, are being pursued in order to 
advance rights to sexual or bodily integrity have not necessarily proved to be progressive, 
and have had paradoxical implications. This situation forces an interrogation of the 
relationship between feminist goals and law.  
 
Each moment has been presented as a victory for women’s rights. Yet the analysis 
in Subversive Sites would complicate these outcomes. The sexual harassment decision 
and law produced guidelines that were sweeping in terms of breadth and scope, and 
included sexual speech and sexual conduct. The orthodoxies nestled within the law 
exemplified how the issue of sexuality remains framed within a negative discourse, 
where female sexuality continues to be regarded as something to be protected. The CLA 
Act  further exemplifies this trend, where sexuality is increasingly framed within a 
carceral politics.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 The 2014 National Crime Records Bureau report Crime in India showed there has 
been a staggering increase in crimes against women, including an increase of 9.2 percent  
from 2013, and over a 100 percent increase in the incidence of crimes against women 
since 2004.  National Crime Records Bureau, Crime in India - 2014 (Minister of Home 
Affairs Government of India, 2014) at 88. 
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At the same time, gender has not remained a monopoly of feminist activists and 
advocates. Sexual rights advocates, religious orthodoxies, and the neo-liberal market 
have all become significant players and advanced agendas on gender that challenge 
dominant feminist positions. The protests that erupted after the Delhi rape, brought 
thousands of young men and women on to the streets of major metropolitan cities in 
India. It was a rare sight in a liberal democracy to see thousands on the street protesting 
specifically on the issue of violence against women. At one level these protests were 
about the exhaustion that young women experience on a daily basis at being pawed, 
ogled at, molested, in the process of going about their everyday lives, including getting 
on a bus and going to work. At the same time these protests were almost entirely driven 
by young men and women who were born in the crucible of neo-liberal market reforms 
and are now consumer citizens. They brought the issue of violence against women into 
the public space from a very different place than the feminists who first engaged with 
rape in the context of the Mathura rape.53 It is a space of the educated young aspirational 
middle class for whom freedom is expressed in terms of the market and laws’ role is to 
facilitate that freedom rather than provide that freedom. It is a politics that is 
transformative in its rejection of gender as tethered exclusively to familial relationships, 
and demands equal rights as citizens rather than as mothers, wives and daughters. 
 
The collaboration of the religious right, which has only continued its ascension to 
governance in the intervening years, with the neo-liberal market, operates to enable 
specific understandings of gender, where sexuality remains firmly regulated by the 
criminal law, and cultural norms. Gender liberation is demonstrated through greater 
employment opportunities while at the same time the Hindu Right seeks to embed 
women’s liberation firmly within the context of a specific Hindu family form and marital 
relationship. The space for the legal recognition of a more pluralistic understanding of 
relationships and families remains fraught, even though the lived reality is quite different. 
Live in relationships, heterosexual and homosexual, are not uncommon. Recently, the 
Supreme Court recognised the right of “unwed” mothers to the custody of their children. 
Transgendered persons have been declared by the Court as having all the constitutional 
equality rights as all other citizens, including the right to marry.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 The Mathura rape case involved a custodial rape of a young tribal woman, who was 
between the ages of 14-16, in 1972. While the sessions court acquitted the two accused 
policemen, stating that the victim was “habituated to sexual intercourse” and her consent 
was voluntary, the Bombay High Court overturned the acquittal, holding that passive 
submission due to fear induced by threats to life could not be construed as consent. The 
Supreme Court overturned the High Court ruling, partly on the grounds that Mathura did 
not show signs of resistance, had no visible marks of injury on her body and did not 
scream or raise any alarm. One of the justices stated that as “she was used to sex, she may 
have incited the cops … to have intercourse.” The sex was thus construed as consensual: 
Tukaram and Another v State of Maharashtra (1979) All India Reports 185. The holding 
led to several academics writing a letter to the Supreme Court protesting against the 
Court’s construction of consent. And the decision resulted in the formation of women’s 
groups in India, feminist mobilisation on rape and the first public campaigns for law 
reform of the rape laws.  
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The increased visibility of women in the public arena, their dress, style, and sense 
of self-confidence have been partly facilitated in and through the market. The market has 
been a central player in producing this “new Indian woman” or “desi girl” who is oozing 
self-confidence and a “power girl”. Yet this new face of the Indian woman struggles 
against a cultural space that is resisting her transformation. Violence against women 
remains endemic in India. And any number of laws have not stemmed the tide. The laws 
that have focused on criminal justice and carcerality have only encouraged the emergence 
of a sexual security regime that governs and regulates the expressions of sexuality in the 
interests not of women, but of the security of the nation-state and stability of the market. 
The fact that young men and women supported some of the more drastic provisions of the 
CLA Act 2013, even while expressing their rights to equality and freedom on the street, is 
evidence of the contradictory space that gender inhabits.  
 
 Yet, we also have seen a shift to other forms of regulation, including as discussed 
here, the use of employment and family law to address issues of sexual violence.  While 
the simple shift to non-criminal modes of regulation is not a panacea, it is a shift that is 
worth further interrogation. Non-carceral approaches may offer a possibility of avoiding 
the reliance on the state as a sexual security regime, and may offer victims of sexual 
violence a broader range of choices and legal alternatives. Rethinking Subversive Sites 
would lead us to consider a broader range of alternative modalities of justice and 
governance. What might the role be for a revision of restorative justice? How do 
contemporary forms of legal regulation produce self-governing subjects? What is the 
relationship between legal and non-legal discourses in producing these self-governing 
subjects?   
 
 We have raised here a number of questions about feminist engagement in law that 
we would approach somewhat differently. It is intended as a modest reflection piece. We 
make no claim about the comprehensiveness of these approaches. An exciting new 
generation of legal, feminist and queer scholars has emerged interrogating a vast array of 
legal engagements, strategies and discourses, from a multiplicity of approaches. The 
future of feminist and other critical engagement with law lies in their critical 
interventions and imaginations.    
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
